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31. Introduction
Since the 1970s there has been a growing concern in Western societies regarding the loss in efficiency
due to disincentives and distortions on worker behavior caused by progressive taxation. The perceived
disincentives on labor supply appeared to be the major justification for reducing  marginal tax rates in
many European nations during the 80s and the early 90s. However, relaxing the degree of progression
in taxes is often questioned since this reform may bring about unacceptable distributional effects.
Traditionally, empirical analyses of taxation, labor supply and welfare ignore distributional effects and
solely report aggregated equivalent variation, compensating variation or deadweight loss, or  welfare
effects for a "representative" individual. Measures of this kind are not particularly helpful when
concern is primarily turned to questions about who gains and who loses. To deal with these questions
a microeconometric model for simulating the distribution of gains and losses over households is
required. The model which is employed in this study relies on an explicit utility representation of
household preferences. Thus, we may define monetary measures of welfare in terms of the indirect
utility function. We draw on King (1983) by deriving measures of welfare from equivalent incomes
defined in terms of a reference household and the prices this household faces. The introduction of a
reference state is made in order to obtain a common reference price vector as a basis for comparing
welfare across households, and is motivated by the fact that the price of leisure in general will vary
across individuals and will change when taxes are changed. However, since the conclusions of the
analysis may depend on the choice of reference state a sensitivity study will be provided. Like
Hausman and Poterba (1987) and Bosworth and Burtless (1992) in their evaluation of the US tax
reforms we focus on labor supply  and welfare effects for married couples. Our approach differs,
however, from theirs by treating labor supply of husband and wife as a joint decision problem.
As an alternative to our approach Blackorby et al. (1994) propose a method for evaluation of
social welfare that is independent of the choice of reference state. Moreover, they provide conditions
under which social welfare prescriptions are independent from reference prices. In general, the
conditions turn out to require fairly restrictive specifications of both household preferences and social
welfare functions. This is demonstrated by the fact that price independence is obtained only when
preferences are homothetic, which is different from the specification of preferences in the model used
in the present study. However, there is a trade-off between price and/or reference state independence
and flexibility or plausibility of preferences. To rely on homothetic preferences in order to obtain price
independence seems to be an extreme choice along this trade-off. Whether and to what extent welfare
4prescriptions are price independent is an empirical question which can be answered by a sensitivity
analysis where results based on different reference states are produced.
The purpose of this paper is, first, to discuss methodological principles for social evaluation
of income taxation and tax reforms, and, second, to present an empirical analysis based on Italian
household data. Using a microeconometric household labor supply model we have simulated
behavioral responses and welfare gains and losses for married couples resulting from replacing the
Italian tax system as of 1993 by proportional taxation. The methodology for welfare evaluation is
explained in Section 2, whilst a brief outline of the microeconometric labor supply model which we
use in the analysis of tax reforms is given in the appendix. The simulation results are reported in
Section 3. Section 4 provides a summary and a discussion.
2. Interhousehold comparison and social evaluation of individual
welfare gains and losses
Applied welfare analyses of tax reforms must deal with comparison and social evaluation of the
changes in welfare of different households or individuals. As will be demonstrated below the
conclusions attained from these types of analyses may depend crucially on the informational basis of
the employed evaluative system.
The standard approach for determining the change in welfare resulting from tax reforms is to
employ monetary measures like compensation variation and equivalent variation. These measures are
defined in terms of money values of indirect utilities. For given consumer prices and a reference tax
regime f* the money metric utility yik is defined implicitly by
(1) ( ) ( )~ , ~ , , , ,*V y f V I f ki ik i i k= = 0 1
where ~Vi  and Ii are the indirect utility function and exogeneous income of household i.
1
 The pre- and
post-reform tax regimes, denoted f0 and f1, are common to all individuals. Thus, yik affords household i
the same level of utility under tax regime f* as that attained under tax regime fk with exogeneous
income Ii. It may then appear natural to employ the change in the money metric utilities, caused by
moving from tax system f0 to tax system f1, as a measure of the welfare change. This measure, which
is given by
(2) WG y yi i1 i= − 0 ,
                                                    
1
  For expository reasons we suppress the dependence of the reference tax regime in the notation of the money metric utility.
5clearly depends on the choice of reference tax system. Thus, a specific choice of reference tax system
represents a particular normalization of a household's ordinal utility function even though WGi is
invariant with respect to monotonic increasing transformations of the utility function ~Vi . When the
post-reform tax system f1 is taken as reference system, i.e. f f* ,= 1  then the compensating variation
CVi, defined by
(3) CV I yi i i= − 0 ,
emerges as a special case of WGi. By inserting (3) in (1) when f f* = 1  it follows that CVi may be
defined implicitly by
(4) ( ) ( )~ , ~ , .V I CV f V I fi i i i i− =1 0
As an alternative to CV we may use equivalent variation (EV) which emerges from (2) when
the initial tax system is taken as reference system.
Compensating variation, equivalent variation and the various other measures defined by (2)
represent alternative measures of the welfare change of moving from tax system f0 to tax system f1.
These measures differ with respect to the choice of reference tax system. Thus, the magnitudes of the
CVs may differ from the corresponding magnitudes of alternative welfare measures defined by (2), for
example the EVs. The sign of CVi, EVi and any other WGi will, however, be the same for any choice
of reference system since WGi for different reference systems represent alternative measures of the
same utility difference. Thus, irrespective of choice of reference state we are nevertheless capable to
determine the proportions of winners and losers of the reform from (2).
As emphasized by Sen (1974), King (1983) and Hammond (1990) one needs to compare
gains of some to losses of others when concern is basically turned to the distributional impact of the
reform. As a first step we might introduce interhousehold comparability without cardinality which
allows a description of how the reform affects the rankings of households in the distribution of
household welfare. But, of course this approach does not solve the problem of comparing the
magnitudes of gains and losses. Alternatively, we may use the householdspecific WGs as basis for
social judgments. The WGs or utility differences are then required to be interhousehold comparable.
Judgments based on interhousehold comparison of utility differences allow for statements such as
(5) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )~ , ~ , ~ , ~ , ,V I f V I f V I f V I fi i i i j j j j1 0 1 0− > −
6which means that household i gains more than household j from the tax reform. Alternatively, the
statement (5) may be expressed in terms of money values of utility differences as defined in (2). The
informational structure given by (5) allows comparisons of gains and losses of a reform as captured by
the WG-measures.
Aggregating the household-specific WGs as basis for social judgement may, however, be
less meaningful since the normative significance of aggregation across the distribution of WGs is still
not clear. This is due to the fact that the price of leisure and the level of the pre-reform utility vary
between households. The latter point simply means that we do not know whether a household with,
say, a large WG  had a low or high pre-reform utility. To deal with these problems King (1983)
suggested to base the comparison of gains and losses on equivalent incomes defined in terms of the
state of a reference household. Equivalent income ( )yikR  for household i is then defined as that level of
(exogenous) income that affords the reference household (R) the same level of utility under the
reference tax regime f* as household i attains under the tax regime fk , i.e. y ik
R
 is defined implicitly by
(6) ( ) ( )~ , ~ , ; , ,*V y f V I f kR ikR i i k= = 0 1
Thus, the difference between y i1
R
 and y i
R
0  emerges as a natural measure of the welfare effect of the
reform to household i. Since the money values of the households' utilities are defined in terms of a
reference household who faces fixed prices, this measure can be considered as a specific choice of WG
that allows comparison of welfare changes across households . Thus, we denote it comparable welfare
gain (CWG),
(7) CWG y yi iR iR= −1 0 .
Application of (7) requires utilities to be cardinal comparable across households. This
informational structure allows gains and losses of different households to be compared. Moreover,
since welfare comparisons between households are made in terms of the money metric utility of a
reference household, interhousehold comparable CWGs also allow the money metric utility levels of
households to be compared. However, as is also recognized by King (1983) welfare comparisons
based on equivalent incomes and comparable welfare gains may depend on the choice of reference
household and reference prices. Thus, it is important to examine the sensitivity of the results with
regard to the choice of reference state.
An alternative to the approach above is to employ WG as a measure of welfare change and
relate the householdspecific WGs to welfare relevant attributes such as age, number of children and
pre-reform income. This type of approach is in line with the suggestions of Hammond (1990). In this
7framework households' observed incomes and/or other welfare relevant attributes form the basis for
comparisons of gains and losses and thus serve the same purpose as the reference household and
equivalent income in the CWG-approach. However, although the comparisons of WGs are closely
related to other welfare relevant variables the interhousehold comparability is weakened due to the
fact that the WGs are computed at different prices of leisure and different household characteristics.
When evaluating the welfare effects of a tax system and/or a tax reform it may be useful to
summarize the gains and losses by a social welfare function. The simplest welfare function is the one
that adds up the comparable welfare gains (CWGs) over households. The objection to the linear
additive welfare function is that the households are given equal welfare weights, independent of
whether they are poor or rich. Concern for distributive justice requires, however, that poor households
are assigned larger welfare weights than rich households. This structure is captured by the following
family of welfare functions,
(8) W a
y dG y a a
y dG y a
ak
a
k
k
= −
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=
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where Gk is the distribution of equivalent incomes under tax regime fk and a is the inequality aversion
parameter which shows increasing inequality aversion with increasing values.
Let ~yak  be the equally distributed equivalent level of equivalent income derived from (8).
Thus, ~yak  is given by
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Then, following Kolm(1969) and Atkinson (1970) a family of inequality measures may be defined as
(10) I yak ak
k
= −1
~
µ
,
where µ k ky= ~0  is the mean level of equivalent income under tax regime k.
As demonstrated by King (1983) we can interpret the ratio defined by
(11) ( )( )γ
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8as the equal proportionate increase in pre-reform equivalent incomes which would give a level of
social welfare equal to that attained under the post-reform tax system. King (1983) denotes  the
proportionate social gain. Since Wak reduces to the sum of equivalent incomes when a = 0 ,
0 is simply the ratio between the mean equivalent incomes under the post- and the pre-reform
systems. Thus, 0 only captures the efficiency effects of the reform.
The normative foundation of (8) and (9) relies on the parallel with the expected utility theory
of choice under uncertainty. Similarly, we may use the non-expected utility theory (see Yaari, 1987,
1988) to justify application of the following welfare functions,
(12) ( )
( )
~
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where b is the inequality aversion parameter. Note that the inequality aversion decreases when b
increases. It follows by straightforward calculations that ~Wbk k≤µ  and that 
~Wbk is equal to the mean
k if and only if Gk is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, 
~Wbk  can be interpreted as the equally
distributed equivalent level of equivalent income under tax regime k.
Aaberge (1995) used (12) as basis for deriving the following family of inequality measures,
(13) C W bbk bk
k
= − ≥1 1
~
, .
µ
Note that { }C bbk , ≥ 2  is equal to the "generalized" Gini family introduced by Mehran (1976). It can
be easily verified that C2k is equal to the Gini coefficient. Moreover, Aaberge (1995) demonstrated
that C1k exhibits more inequality aversion than the Gini coefficient which in return exhibits more
inequality aversion than C3k.
Analogously to (8)-(11), (12) forms the basis for the following alternative measure of
proportionate social gain,
(14) ( )( )ξ
µ
µb
b1
b
b1
b
W
W
C
C
= =
−
−
~
~
0
1
0 0
1
1
.
In the limiting case when b  ,  b reduces to the ratio between the means of the post- and pre-
reform equivalent incomes.
The essential difference between the social welfare measures derived from (8) and (12) is
revealed by their sensitivity to transfers. While the transfer properties of Iak and a solely depend on
9the choice of the inequality parameter a, the transfer sensitivity properties of Cbk and b depend on the
form of the distribution(s) of equivalent income as well as on the choice of the inequality aversion
parameter b. This means that the weighting-profile on transfers will depend on the relative occurence
of small, medium-sized and large equivalent incomes.
3. Empirical results based on Italian data
The labor supply model outlined in the Appendix  has been estimated on Italian data for married
couples in 1993. The estimation results and the labor supply elasticities have been reported and
discussed by Aaberge et al. (1998b). This paper uses the estimated labor supply model as a basis for
examining the efficiency and welfare effects of the Italian tax system as of 1993. Note that the model
we use takes simultaneously into account
 both spouses' choices
 exact representation of income taxes
 constraints on the distribution of hours.
Recently, there have been a few empirical studies of labor supply which account for constraints on
available jobs and hours. Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1987) allow for involuntary employment and
Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990) and Dickens and Lundberg (1993) impose restrictions on available
hours. We refer to Aaberge et al. (1998a) for a discussion of differences between these approaches and
our approach.
For the purpose of comparison we replace the 1993 tax rules by a proportional taxation of
personal income. The proportional tax system may then be viewed both as a reference tax and as a tax
reform. The estimated microeconometric model is employed to simulate labor supply and
distributional effects as well as the proportional tax rate, under the constraint of a given total tax
revenue. The proportional tax rate is simulated to be 18.4 per cent whilst the average tax in 1993 was
20.4 per cent. The justification for replacing current taxes by proportional taxation is that proportional
tax on wage income is considered by many to yield the least distortions among tax systems that can be
implemented. However, a proportional (flat) tax system is in any case a helpful device for interpreting
efficiency and welfare effects of alternative non-proportional tax systems.
Table 1. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and taxes
for married couples under alternative tax regimes by deciles of disposable household
income under 1993-taxes
Annual hours of work Households, 1000 ITL 1993
Decile
Participation
rates,
per cent
Given
participation
In the total
population
Gross
income
Taxes Dis-
posable
income
10
M F M F M F
1993-
tax rules
1
2
3-8
9
10
95.6
97.5
98.9
99.3
99.4
14.1
19.9
43.8
65.5
74.4
1571
1832
1991
2117
2237
1030
1209
1546
1731
1828
1501
1787
1970
2103
2225
 145
 241
 677
1133
1361
 15221
 24372
 48187
 85135
128396
  525
 2109
 8960
19983
34365
14695
22263
39227
65152
94032
All 98.5 43.7 1972 1590 1943  694  54225 11074 43150
Propor-
tional
taxes1)
1
2
3-8
9
10
95.4
97.8
99.0
99.4
99.5
19.6
24.4
44.7
64.5
73.2
1706
1924
2048
2162
2267
1264
1397
1585
1741
1834
1627
1882
2027
2150
2257
 247
 342
 709
1124
1344
 22933
 31761
 54142
 89459
132888
 4219
 5845
 9961
16460
24452
 18714
 25917
 44181
 72999
108435
All 98.6 45.0 2036 1623 2008  731  60189 11074  49115
1) The proportional tax rate of 18.4 per cent is determined by model simulation when the tax revenue is held
fixed equal to the 1993 tax revenue.
The simulation results of labor supply, gross household income, taxes and disposable household
income are given in Table 1. Under the 1993 tax system the female participation rate is rather low,
except for females belonging to the 20 per cent richest households. We also note that females' and
males' hours supplied, given participation, increase with household income. Finally, we observe that
the ratio of taxes to gross household income varies from around 3 per cent for the 10 per cent poorest
households, 19 per cent for the 60 per cent in the middle and 27 per cent for the 10 per cent richest.
The results of Table 1 demonstrate that females and males in the 10 per cent poorest
households are most responsive to the transition to proportional taxation. On average these females
and males increase their annual labor supply by 100 hours. Note that even rich couples  increase their
hours supplied. The total effect is that hours supplied increase by 4 per cent.
There is one apparently counter-intuitive result in Table 1 which provides a good example of
different implications of our labor supply model compared with a traditional approach based on a
labor supply function. Since the flat tax (18.4 per cent) is higher than the first marginal tax under the
1993 system (10 per cent), we might expect a decrease in participation rates. A traditional model
would assume that every hour of work (h) is equally available in the choice set. Moreover, given
preferences, the utility associated to a particular point in the choice set would be uniquely determined
by (h,w). Under these assumptions a traditional model would indeed predict a decrease in participation
rates under proportional taxation. In the model presented in this paper, however, not every value of h
is equally likely to be available in the choice set. Job opportunities offering less than 1846 or more
than 2106 hours are relatively unlikely to be found. The opportunities in the range 1846-2106 imply
lower tax rates under proportional taxation than under the 1993 tax system. Thus participation may
become more attractive. Moreover, in our model the utility is random; there are unobserved
components attached to every market and non-market opportunity which makes it more or less
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desirable. Thus a market opportunity may turn out to be more desirable than a non-market opportunity
(non-participation) even if the opposite is true when the comparison is made solely in terms of hours
and disposable income. This effect is also confirmed by Table 2 which shows the flows between labor
market states for men and women induced by the switch to a different tax system. In the case of men,
Table 2 shows that essentially every employed men under the 1993 tax regime remains employed
under flat taxation. Of those relatively few who are not employed in the pre-reform state, 12.5 per cent
will choose employment after the reform. This seems to be caused by the fact that market jobs (mostly
full-time jobs, in the case of men) become more attractive due to a lower tax burden under the flat tax
regime. Turning to the women, the picture gets more complicated. The flow from non-participation to
participation (6.3 per cent)  can be given the same interpretation as above. However, here we also have
a significant flow from participation to non-participation (5 per cent). This effect can be explained by
the fact that women are more likely than men to be located on a job with few hours and/or low wage.
For a woman in this position the employment status under flat taxation may become less attractive
than under the 1993 tax regime, and even less attractive than non-participation. The increased female
participation rate suggests, however, that the first effect prevails upon the second.
Table 2. Flows into and out of employment, per cent
Proportional
taxation Not employed Employed
1993
tax rules M F M F
Not employed 87.5 93.7 12.5  6.3
Employed  0.1  5.0 99.9 95.0
It is worth noting that the tax reform increases the average gross income and disposable
income in all groups of households, but that taxes as proportion of income are increased for the
poorest 20 per cent and decreased for the richest 20 per cent. The changes in diposable income are
substantial, and are caused by increased labor supply and thus increased gross income for the poor and
reduced tax burden for the rich. In accordance with these results we observe from Table 3 that the
inequality in the distribution of gross and disposable household income, as measured by the Gini
coefficient, increased by approximately 3 and 17 per cent, respectively. To give an interpretation of
the magnitude of the change in the Gini coefficient we will employ the hypothetical intervention
method suggested by Aaberge (1997). This method shows that the increase of 17 per cent for the Gini
coefficient corresponds to imposing an equal-sized lump-sum tax of 17 per cent of the mean
disposable household income in 1993 followed by redistributing the collected tax revenue (7 336 000
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ITL per couple) as proportional transfers where each couple receives 17 per cent of its disposable
income in 1993. Note that this intervention consists of regressive transfers and leaves the mean income
unchanged. From the figures based on 1993-taxes, displayed in Table 1, we find that the hypothetical
intervention reduces the disposable income of the 10 per cent poorest couples by 33 per cent and
increases the disposable income of the 10 per cent richest couples by 9 per cent.
Table 3. Gini coefficients for the distributions of gross and disposable household income
Tax system Gross income Disposable
income
1993 tax rules .323 .283
Proportional taxation .332 .332
The distributional effects of the reform that are reported in Table 3 solely concern income.
However, since the replacement of the 1993 tax-system by proportional taxation leads to increased
disposable income that for most couples are attained at the cost of lower leisure the welfare effects
from the reform is not clear. To address this issue we report distributions of welfare gains and losses
when WG defined by (2) is used as a measure of welfare. We use proportional taxation as reference
tax system. The reason for this choice is that the evaluation of the equivalent income defined by (1) is
computationally much more convenient than if we use a tax system which allows tax rates to be
endogenous. Since the proportional tax system both acts as a tax reform and a reference tax system
WG can in this case be interpreted as a measure of compensating variation.
13
Table 4. The distribution of WG by losers and winners, and by deciles of household income
under 1993-taxes
All Losers Winners
Decile Mean WG,
1000 ITL
Per cent of
population
Mean WG,
1000 ITL
Per cent of
population
Mean WG,
1000 ITL
1
2
3-8
9
10
 -2108
 -2147
    791
  5895
13817
85.9
81.0
48.7
13.5
 9.4
-3050
-3390
-2654
-3012
-6181
14.1
19.0
51.3
86.5
90.6
 3664
 3146
 4062
 7286
15878
All   2020 48.2 -2927 51.8  6627
Table 4 shows that
 51.8 per cent of the population gains from the reform.
The majority of the 20 per cent poorest couples are losers whilst the majority of the 20
per cent richest couples are winners. We note that if the reform should have been decided upon in a
referendum a majority would have economic motives to vote yes. Moreover, we find that the ratio of
WG to tax revenue is equal to 18 per cent, which means that the cost of the 1993 tax system relative to
a proportional tax system is 18 per cent when the sum of household-specific WGs is used as a measure
of social welfare. However, as is demonstrated by Table 4 an aggregated measure of welfare may
shadow for significant variation in welfare across couples. These results clearly support the view held
by King (1983) and Hammond (1990) that it is of great importance to account for heterogeneity in
applied welfare analysis.
Table 5 characterizes the 10 per cent who lose most and the 10 per cent who gain most. The
latter group has on average a disposable income which is almost 2.5 times higher than the disposable
income of the former. Note that the corresponding ratio of the mean disposable income of 10 per cent
richest and 10 per cent poorest households is more than twice as high. This result indicates that some
of the rich households are not included in the group of the 10 per cent who gain most, and that some of
the poor households are not included in the group of the 10 per cent who lose most. A striking
difference between the 10 per cent who lose and gain most is that in the households of winners both
females and males work longer hours under the 1993 tax regime than males and females in the
households of losers.
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Table 5. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income under 1993
rules and mean WG of the 10 per cent households who lose and gain most from a pro-
portional tax reform
Participation rates
per cent
Annual hours of work
(In the population)
Households,
1000 ITL
M F M F
Gross
income
Disposable
income
WG
(1000
ITL)
10 per cent
who lose most 99.4 28.0 1732  367  33101 32067  -6146
10 per cent
who gain most 99.4 57.5 2252 1935 112398 79082 19098
As emphasized in Section 2 welfare measures like compensating variation and equivalent variation or
any other WG-measure do not provide an appropriate informational basis for making social
evaluation. This is due to the fact that these measures are not designed to be comparable across
households. To construct comparable measures of welfare we use a similar strategy as King (1983)
and base comparisons of welfare gains and losses on equivalent incomes defined in terms of the state
of a reference household and again using proportional taxation as the reference tax system. The
corresponding measure of welfare gain, denoted comparable welfare gain (CWG), is defined by
equations (6) and (7) in Section 2.
Table 6 gives the labor supply and household incomes under the two tax regimes by
equivalent income rather than cash income under the 1993 tax regime. The median income household
is used as reference household. If we compare Tables 1 and 6 we observe that labor supply and
disposable incomes are more evenly distributed under the two tax regimes, when households are
ranked according to equivalent income rather than cash income. This is simply due to the fact that
households with low incomes normally work fewer hours than households with high incomes.
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Table 6. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and taxes
for married couples under alternative tax regimes by deciles of equivalent income1) un-
der 1993-taxes.
Annual hours of work Households, 1000 ITL
Tax
system
Decile
Participation
rates,
per cent
Given
participation
In the total
population
Gross
income
Taxes Dis-
posable
income
M F M F M F
1993-
tax rules
1
2
3-8
9
10
98.24
98.56
98.61
98.56
98.47
39.58
41.30
43.45
46.67
48.43
1961
1965
1969
1978
2002
1488
1581
1585
1623
1672
1926
1937
1942
1949
1972
589
653
689
759
809
34364
39510
52649
69273
83208
 5778
 7117
10702
15360
18274
28586
32392
41947
53913
64933
All 98.55 43.67 1972 1590 1943 694 54225 11074 43150
Propor-
tional
taxes1)
1
2
3-8
9
10
98.10
98.52
98.73
98.52
98.56
41.90
42.55
44.89
47.73
48.70
2074
2066
2032
2008
2026
1550
1635
1620
1637
1680
2034
2035
2006
1978
1997
649
695
728
782
818
42099
46917
58754
73714
86636
 7744
 8635
10810
13563
15941
34355
38282
47944
60151
70695
All 98.61 45.02 2036 1623 2008 731 60189 11074 49115
1) Median income household is the reference household.
Table 7 gives the distribution of CWG by losers and winners. If we compare the results here
with those set out in Table 4 we observe that the proportions of winners and losers in the total
population are equal. This follows from the fact that the identification of these proportions solely
requires ordinal utility information. No interpersonal comparability of utilities is required, and hence
the estimates of the proportions of winners and loosers are independent of the method employed for
measuring the magnitudes of gains and losses.
The results of Table 7 demonstrate that the structure of the estimated gains and losses is
maintained when we change reference household, although the magnitudes of the welfare changes
vary with the choice of reference household. From Table 8 we also observe that labor supply and
incomes vary only slightly with the choice of reference household within the groups of winners and
losers.
Figures 1-4 provide more detailed information on the distribution of gains and losses within
decile groups of cash income and equivalent income. In Figure 1 households in each decile of the
distribution of disposable cash income are re-ranked by the change in welfare measured by WG, and
divided into subdecile groups according to the magnitude of the WGs. By arranging households in
deciles of equivalent income rather than cash income, similar information as provided by Figure 1 is
provided by Figures 2. For each decile of cash or equivalent income the vertical lines of Figures 1 and
2 connect the means of the first and tenth decile in the distribution of WG. Thus, the length of the
vertical lines shows the dispersion of WGs within each decile group. As complementary information
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we also display the mean and median WG within each decile group. By comparing Figures 1 and 2 we
see that the dispersion of WGs increases with increasing household cash income and equivalent
income, respectively. Moreover, when the WGs are related to cash income we find that the majority
within the five lowest deciles lose from the reform and that the majority within the five highest deciles
are winners. It follows from Figure 2 that this pattern almost disappear when equivalent income is
used as a ranking criterion. However, when the welfare change is measured by CWG rather than by
WG it is demonstrated by Figures 3-5 that the distribution of losers and winners across deciles is
restored. Figures 3-5 also show that the structure of the distribution of CWG do not depend on the
choice of reference household. The essential feature of this structure is that the households on average
gain from replacing the 1993 tax system by proportional taxation, but that the efficiency gain is
attained at the cost of increased inequality.
Table 7. The distribution of CWG by losers and winners, and by deciles of household equivalent
income1) under 1993-taxes
All Losers Winners
Deciles Mean CWG, 1000 ITL
Per
cent
of pop.
Mean CWG, 1000 ITL
Per
cent
of pop.
Mean CWG, 1000 ITL
I II III I II III I II III
1 -175 -122 -181 58.4 -10191 -5228 -5603 41.5 13858  7051  7539
2 740 457 389 56.5 -11287 -5641 -5993 43.5 16432  8310  8709
3-8 5717 2848 2862 48.0 -12050 -6029 -6190 52.0 22175 11058 11214
9 12831 6307 6241 39.9 -13201 -6607 -6544 60.1 30186 14926 14856
10 14832 7325 7292 39.1 -16663 -8299 -8119 60.9 35132 17460 17138
All 6253 3105 3091 48.2 -12206 -6121 -6282 51.8 23477 11703 11826
1) I = equivalent income is defined in terms of the poorest household under 1993-taxes
II = equivalent income is defined as terms of the median-income household under 1993-taxes
III = equivalent income is defined in terms of the richest household under 1993-taxes
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Table 8. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income under 1993
rules and mean CWG of the 10 per cent households who gain most and the 10 per cent
households who lose most from a proportional tax reform
Reference Losers and
Participation rates.
Per cent
Annual hours of work
(In the population) Households, 1000 ITL
household winners
M F M F
Gross
income
Disp.
income CWG
Poorest
10 per cent
who lose most 99.5 24.1 1691  303  30133 29431 -25659
household 10 per cent
who gain most 99.3 58.0 2244 1046 112450 79043  64767
Median-
income
10 per cent
who lose most 99.5 23.8 1689  300  29864 29219 -12845
household 10 per cent
who gain most 99.3 58.0 2242 1046 112330 78958  32271
Richest
10 per cent
who lose most 99.5 23.5 1692  294  29158 28655 -13121
household 10 per cent
who gain most 99.3 57.6 2246 1042 111934 78647 32390
Although the detailed information provided by Tables 7 and 8 and Figures 2-4 are basic for
evaluating the welfare effects of a tax system or a tax reform, it may be useful to summarize this
information by means of a social welfare function. To this end we use Wak defined by (8) for
a and=1 1 5 2, .  and ~Wbk  defined by (12) for b and=1 2 3, . The corresponding measures of social
welfare have been calculated for both the pre- and post-reform distributions of equivalent income. The
values of proportionate social gain based on a defined by (11) and b defined by (14), measured as
percentage changes ( )~γ γa a= −100 1  and ( )~ξ ξb b= −100 1 , are given by Table 9. Note that ~γ 0
ignores distributional effects and solely captures the efficiency gains of the reform.
Table 9. Proportionate social gain of a flat tax reform. Per cent
Reference household ~γ 0 ~γ 1 ~ .γ 1 5 ~γ 2 ~ξ1 ~ξ2 ~ξ3
Poorest household 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.1
Median income household 2.2 1.4 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.8 1.2
Richest household 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.6 0 0.5 1.1
The results provided by Table 9 show that the social gain from introducing a proportional tax system
is rather modest and that this conclusion is robust with respect to choice of social welfare function.
This means that the gain in efficiency is attained at the cost of increased inequality in the distribution
of equivalent income; actually, the increased inequality offsets the gain in efficiency when 1  is used
18
as a measure of change in social welfare. Recall that 1  exhibits more inequality aversion than 2  and
that 2   exhibits more inequality aversion than 3. The relative change in the inequality in the
distribution of equivalent income resulting from the proportional tax reform is given by Table 10.
Table 10. Relative change in inequality in the distribution of equivalent income when the 1993
tax system is replaced by proportional taxation
100 1 0
0
⋅
−I I
I
a a
a
100 1 0
0
⋅
−C C
C
b b
b
Reference household a = 1 a = 1 5. a = 2 b =1 b = 2 b = 3
Poorest household 9.0 9.2 9.3 4.1 4.4 4.3
Median income household 8.9 9.2  9.5 4.2 4.6 4.0
Richest household 9.9 10.1 10.2 4.9 5.1 4.8
4. Summary and discussion
This study discusses methodological principles for social evaluation of income taxation and tax
reforms with particular reference to distributional issues. The discussion is followed by an empirical
analysis based on Italian household data. Using a household microeconometric labor supply model we
have simulated behavioral responses and welfare gains and losses for married couples resulting from
replacing the Italian tax system as of 1993 by proportional taxation. The model allows for observed as
well as unobserved characteristics in preferences and opportunities, for spouses' simultaneous
decisions, for non-convex budget sets due to the complexity of the tax system and for quantity
constraints on the choice of hours of work. Altogether this gives a complex model with non-
homothetic preferences. Due to the presence of corner solutions from utility maximization we find it
convenient to define money measures of welfare in terms of indirect utility rather than in terms of the
expenditure function. In our approach the utility function is directly specified and is thus not required
to be recovered by  integrating the supply function. We draw on King (1983) by deriving welfare
measures from equivalent incomes in terms of a reference household and the prices this household
faces. However, our approach differs from King's (1983) by using proportional taxation as a reference
tax system. Since the results of the empirical analysis may depend on the choice of reference
household a sensitivity study has been provided. In this study the sensitivity analysis shows that the
main conclusions are not affected by the choice of reference state.
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Figure 1.The distribution of WG by deciles of disposable income under 1993-taxes
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Figure 2.The distribution of WG by deciles of equivalent income under 1993-taxes
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Figure 3.The distribution of CWG, defined in terms of the median income household under
1993-taxes, by deciles of equivalent income
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Figure 4.The distribution of CWG, defined in terms of the poorest household under 1993-taxes,
by deciles of equivalent income
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Figure 5. The distribution of CWG, defined in terms of the richest household under 1993-taxes,
by deciles of equivalent income
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Appendix
The microeconometric simulation methodology
Analysis of distributional and efficiency effects from tax and benefit reforms requires a representation
of household preferences with regard to each household member's leisure and their (joint)
consumption. The choice of representation, either through direct/indirect utility functions or implicitly
as labor supply functions, are normally affected by the objective of the analysis and by methodological
convenience. When the analysis is concerned with welfare effects of tax reforms it is, due to the
presence of corner solutions from utility maximization, convenient to define money measures in terms
of the indirect utility function rather than in terms of the expenditure function. This paper relies on an
explicit utility representation of household preferences. For expository reasons we restrict the formal
discussion to single-person households which, to the analyst, have observationally identical
characteristics and constraints. In the empirical specification of the model we analyse the behavior of
married couples and we allow for variation in observed and unobserved characteristics across
individuals, see Aaberge et al. (1995, 1998) for further details.
Let Bi(h,w) denote the set of jobs with hours h > 0 , and wage rate w > 0 , that are feasible to
agent i. ( )Bi 0 0,  is the set of non-market opportunities. Let ( )U C h ji , , denote the utility for agent i of
consumption C, hours h and opportunity j, where ( )j B h w h wi∈ ≥ ≥, , , .0 0  The argument j of the
utility function accounts for the fact that the agent's preferences may vary across job types.
The economic budget constraint is given by
(A.1) ( )C y f wh I= + , ,
where I and y is taxable and non-taxable non-labor income, and f is a function that transforms gross
income into after-tax income. The price index of the composite good (called consumption) is equal to
one. When inserting the budget constraint into the utility function we get ( )( )U y f wh I h ji + , , , .
Furthermore, we will assume that
(A.2) ( ) ( )U y f wh I h j v y f wh I h h wi i ij+ = +( , ), , ( , ), ( , )ε
where v(x,h) is quasi-concave in (x,h), increasing in x and decreasing in h. The random term 	ij(h,w) is
assumed to capture the effect of unobservable attributes associated with opportunity j. Note that this
term is viewed as random from the econometrician's point of view, while it is assumed known to the
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agent. Specifically, ( ){ }ε ij h w,  accounts for the fact that for a given agent, tastes may vary across
opportunities, and for a given opportunity, tastes may vary across agents.
The agent is assumed to maximize the utility in (A.2) under the budget constraint (A.1) and
given the opportunity set available for the agent. Thus, for a given tax and benefit regime the indirect
utility function ~Vi  is defined by
(A.3) ( )[ ]~ ( , ) max max ( , ), , .
, ( , )
V q f U q f wh I h ji h w j B h w ii= +∈
The indirect utility function ~V  may be used as a basis for assessing the efficiency and distributional
effects of tax and benefit reforms. To this end we will employ WG and CWG as money metric
measures of welfare change. The values of WGs and CWGs depend on the parameters of the
household specific utility functions, which in turn are derived from the estimation of the labor supply
density defined by
(A.4) ( ) ( )ϕ i j B h w i h w j B h w ih w U q f hw I h j U q f hw I h ji i( , ) Pr max ( , ), , max max ( , ), , .( , ) , ( , )= + = +



∈ ∈
Note that 
i(h,w) is the probability that individual i chooses a job with hours h and wage rate w. When
the random terms are assumed to be i.i.d. with c.d.f.
(A.5) ( )Pr ( , ) exp , ,ε ij h w z
z
z≤ = −

 >
1 0
it is demonstrated by Dagsvik (1994) that 
i(h,w) is given by
(A.6) ϕ i i i i
i i
x y
i i
h w
h w g g h w
g x y g x y
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
=
+
> >
∑ ∑
Ψ
Ψ Ψ
0
0
0 0
0 0
and
(A.7) ϕ i i
i i
x y
i ig x y g x y
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
=
+
> >
∑ ∑
Ψ
Ψ Ψ
where i(h,w) defined by
(A.8) ( )Ψi ih w v y f wh I h( , ) ( , ),= +
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is the systematic part of the utility function, g0i is the relative number of feasible jobs and gi(h,w) is the
proportion of feasible jobs with hours h and wage rate w.
The extension of (A.6) and (A.7) to cover the case of married couples is straightforward and
completely analogous to the case of single person households. In this case the households have
preferences over income, leisure for husband and wife as well as other characteristics of the job
opportunities. For further details we refer to Dagsvik (1994), Aaberge et al. (1998a) and to Aaberge et
al.(1998b) who also present the empirical specification of the model and report the estimation results.
Based on this information we are able to compute household specific WGs and CWGs. Note, however,
that the presence of unobservable attributes and tastes makes WG and CWG stochastic. Thus, to
compute WGs and CWGs we have to employ stochastic simulations based on (A.3) and (A.5) and the
choice sets { }Bi  described by g0i and gi(h,w). Note that the empirical specification of the choice sets
allows for quantity constraints which means that available hours are non-uniformly distributed. For
further details on specification of the utility function and the choice sets we refer to Aaberge et al.
(1998b).
